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Product Liability
by Franklin P. Brannen, Jr.*
and Jacob E. Daly**
This Article surveys developments in Georgia product liability law
between June 1, 2011 and May 31, 2012.' This Article covers noteworthy cases decided during this period by the Supreme Court of Georgia,
the Court of Appeals of Georgia, the Supreme Court of the United
States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and
the United States district courts located in Georgia.
I.

EXPERT TESTIMONY

More than six years ago Georgia adopted the Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' standard for assessing the admissibility of
testimony from expert witnesses in civil actions? While the Georgia
appellate courts have provided guidance regarding the application of the
Daubert standard in other types of lawsuits, there have been few
Daubert opinions from the Georgia appellate courts in product liability
cases. 4 Without state appellate court guidance, practitioners and judges

* Counsel in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University (BA,
1992); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1996).
Member, State Bars of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida.
** Of Counsel in the firnm of Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Virginia (BA, 1993); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law
(J.D., curn laude, 2000). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia product liability law during the prior survey period, see
Franklin P. Brannen, Jr. & Jacob E. Daly, ProductLiability, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 63 MERCER L. REV. 279 (2011).
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3. O.C.G. § 24-9-67.1 (2010).
4. See, e.g., Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Grp., P.C., 285 Ga. 667,670-71, 681 S.E.2d
152, 154-55 (2009) (medical malpractice action applying Daubert standard); Mays v. Ellis,
283 Ga. App. 195, 199 n.3, 641 S.E.2d 201, 204 n.3 (2007) (same); Cotten v. Phillips, 280
Ga. App. 280, 286-7, 633 S.E.2d 655, 659-60 (2006) (same).
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must rely on decisions from the federal courts as persuasive authority.'
The following recent opinions offer guidance on Daubert issues in
product liability cases.
The limits that Daubertplaces on novel expert theory were addressed
in Sumner v. Biomet, Inc.,6 a lawsuit in which the plaintiff underwent
surgery involving the placement of a metal-on-metal hip joint prosthesis
in her right hip.' Over the neit few months, multiple x-rays of the
plaintiff's surgically repaired hip revealed that metal debris was floating
in the area of the implant. To remedy this issue, the plaintiff's doctor
decided to replace the original prosthesis with a new one. The plaintiff
filed a lawsuit against the manufacturer of the prosthetic hip joint,
alleging that the prosthetic device was defectively manufactured and
that the manufacturer failed to warn about the defect.8
The plaintiff's expert witness, Rex McLellan, who has a doctorate in
metallurgy, served as the primary source of proof for the plaintiff's claim
that the prosthesis was defectively manufactured. In his initial expert
report, Dr. McLellan indicated that there were areas of chemical
inhomogeneity on the surface of the ball of the prosthesis that caused
particles to shed off of the prosthesis and that this chemical inhomogeneity resulted from improper manufacturing. Through a supplemental
expert report and two depositions, Dr. McLellan's opinion wavered
regarding which metals caused the inhomogenous surface, but he
essentially maintained his theory that the loose particles were ejected
from the prosthesis because of inhomogeneities in the metal used to
make the ball of the prosthesis.9
After discovery, the manufacturer moved to exclude the testimony of
Dr. McLellan, and the trial court considered whether Dr. McLellan's
particle ejection theory satisfied the mandates of Daubert and Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.'" First, the court determined that Dr.
McLellan had not tested his theory or shown that his theory was capable
of being tested." Next, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to
establish that Dr. McLellan's theory had been the subject of publication

5. To interpret the application of Georgia's Daubert statute, courts may seek guidance
from the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997), Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), and federal court interpretations of these decisions. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(0.

6. 434 F. App'x 834 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
7. Id.at 835.
8. Id. at 835-36.

9. Id. at 836-37.
10. Id.at 837.
11. Id. at 840.
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and peer review.1 2 Then, the court highlighted that the plaintiff was
unable to demonstrate a rate of error for Dr. McLellan's theory.13 In
addition, Dr. McLellan had developed his theory solely as part of his
work in this case.' 4 Accordingly, the trial court excluded Dr. McLellan's testimony, holding that Dr. McLellan's particle ejection theory was
the product of unreliable methodology that did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 702.15 Without the testimony from Dr. McLellan, the
trial court granted summary judgment to Biomet. 16
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding Dr. McLellan's testimony. 7 Importantly, the plaintiff failed
to show how Dr. McLellan employed a reliable methodology."
In
reviewing Dr. McLellan's testimony, the appellate court emphasized that
Dr. McLellan essentially agreed his defect theory was practically
incapable of being tested.19 Likewise, the plaintiff failed to come
forward with any scientific literature to support Dr. McLelan's theory
showing either peer review or general acceptance in the scientific
community.'
Finally, because Dr. McLellan developed his theory for
this litigation only, his methodology was even less reliable.21 With this
analysis of the Daubertfactors, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
22
exclusion of Dr. McLellan's testimony was not an abuse of discretion.
The inability of a plaintiff to show that his experts undertook a proper
methodology in reaching their opinions was equally problematic in
Udoinyion v. Michelin North America, Inc. ,23 a product liability lawsuit
in which the plaintiff experienced a tire blowout on his car and brought
suit against Michelin, the manufacturer of the tire.2' In response to
Michelin's summary judgment motion, the plaintiff filed two affidavits
from tire experts who both testified that, based on their inspection, the
tire was defective.' Michelin moved to exclude these affidavits based

12. Id.
13.
14.

Id. at 842.
Id. at 840.

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 841.

18. Id.
19. Id. at 842.

20. Id.
21. Id. at 842-43.
22. Id. at 843.
23.

313 Ga. App. 248, 721 S.E.2d 190 (2011).

24. Id. at 248, 251, 721 S.E.2d at 192, 194.
25. Id. at 249-50, 721 S.E.2d at 193.
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on the requirements of section 24-9-67.1 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated,2 6 and the trial court granted the motion, finding that the
affidavits were "totally inadequate."27
The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed and concluded that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the testimony from
the affidavits.2 Both experts had merely performed a visual inspection
and concluded that the tire was defective.' This cursory analysis was
insufficient.30 The affidavits were deficient because they (1) failed to
provide the facts or data supporting the opinions; (2) did not describe the
methodology used to formulate the opinions regarding the nature of the
defect in the tire; and (3) did not explain how the experts had used a
proper methodology to reach their conclusions based on their inspection
of the tire in this case. Without this necessary support for the experts'
opinions, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.8
The plaintiff in Butler v. Union Carbide Corp.82 also failed to show
how the expert witness undertook a reliable methodology that satisfied
the Daubert criteria.' In that lawsuit, the plaintiff sought damages for
her husband's death from mesothelioma allegedly caused by his exposure
to asbestos-containing products sold by the defendants, including Union
Carbide Corporation. The defendants moved to strike the testimony of
the plaintiff's causation expert, Dr. John Maddox, a pathologist who
opined that every exposure the plaintiff's decedent had to asbestos that
was above the level of asbestos in ambient air contributed to causing the
decedent's mesothelioma. The trial court granted the motion to strike
and excluded Dr. Maddox's testimony from the case. Without this
causation testimony from Dr. Maddox, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Union Carbide."
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that Dr. Maddox undertook a
methodology that was generally accepted in the scientific community and
supported by technical literature. 5 However, the appellate court
disagreed and clarified that the literature did not support a conclusion
that the Union Carbide product was a sufficient source of asbestos to

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1.
Udoinyion, 313 Ga. App. at 248, 251, 721 S.E.2d at 192, 194.
Id. at 248, 721 S.E.2d at 192.
Id. at 251, 721 S.E.2d at 194.
Id.
Id.
310 Ga. App. 21, 712 S.E.2d 537 (2011).
Id. at 25, 712 S.E.2d at 541.
Id. at 21-22, 712 S.E.2d at 538-39.
I& at 26, 712 S.E.2d at 541-42.
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have been a significant factor in causing the mesothelioma. 6 Although
Dr. Maddox's opinion may. have attained general acceptance in the
scientific community, the trial court did not have to give dispositive
weight to this factor. 7 Under Daubert,the trial court may select the
appropriate criteria for each case depending on the nature of the
proffered testimony and the scientific methodology that should have been
employed in that area.38
Finally, the plaintiff complained that the testimony of Dr. Maddox was
excluded because the trial court improperly assessed the credibility of
Dr. Maddox. 9 The appellate court, however, clarified that the trial
court did not assess whether Dr. Maddox was generally credible; instead,
the trial court concluded that Dr. Maddox did not follow a scientifically
reliable methodology to reach his conclusion that asbestos in the Union
Carbide product was a substantial factor in causing the mesothelioma.4 ° To the contrary, the trial court did not examine opposing expert
opinions and conclude that the other opinions were better, nor did it
somehow discredit Dr. Maddox because his opinions were not credible. 4'
The trial court correctly assessed whether Dr. Maddox employed a
reliable scientific methodology to reach his causation opinion.42 With
the trial court's proper application of the Daubert criteria, the court of
appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
43
excluding Dr. Maddox's causation testimony.

II.
A.

DEFENSES

Preemption

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that
federal law is "the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.""
Thus, state laws that conflict with federal law are "without effect."'
A state law conflicts with a federal law "ifit interferes with the methods
by which the federal statute was designed to reach [its] goal," even if

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 26-27, 712 S.E.2d at 542.
Id. at 27-28, 712 S.E.2d at 542-43.
Id. at 28, 712 S.E.2d at 543.
Id.
Id. at 29, 712 S.E.2d at 543.
Id.
Id. at 30, 712 S.E.2d at 544.
Id.

44. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
45. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).

236

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

both the federal law and the state law have the same goal.' Although
preemption issues are typically analyzed in connection with a federal
statute, a federal regulation may have the same preemptive effect as a
federal statute.47 State laws subject to preemption include not only
state statutes and regulations, but also tort duties imposed by state
common law and enforced by lawsuits.48
'The critical question in any pre-emption analysis is always whether
Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state law."4 In
fact, Congress's purpose in enacting the federal law is the "ultimate
touchstone" of the preemption analysis. 0 Congress may manifest its
intent to preempt state law "by express language in a congressional
enactment [i.e., express preemption], by implication from the depth and
breadth of a congressional scheme that occupies the legislative field [i.e.,
field preemption], or by implication because of a conflict with a
congressional enactment [i.e., implied or conflict preemption]. " '
Although Congress's purpose is important, there is a presumption that
Congress did not intend to preempt state law, especially when it has
"'legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally occupied."'5'
Because "the regulation of health and safety matters is
primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern," state law
regulating these matters is preempted only if Congress's intent to do so
is "clear and manifest." 3 When faced with two or more plausible
interpretations of a federal law, this presumption imposes on courts "a
duty to accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption." 4

46. Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987).
47. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) (noting that "a federal
agency acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may [also] preempt state regulation"); see also Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 154 (1982) (noting that a "narrow focus on Congress' intent to supersede state law [is]
misdirected" when a state law is claimed to be preempted by a federal agency's regulation).
48. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993); Cipollone v. Liggett
Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521-22 (1992); see also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Milmen's
Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) (noting that "the obligation to pay
compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and
controlling policy").
49. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 369.
50. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
51. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (citations omitted).
52. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
53. Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715, 719 (1985)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 ("So we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.").
54. Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).

20121

PRODUCTLIABILITY

During the survey period, the United States Supreme Court decided
one case involving field preemption and one case involving implied
preemption.5 5 The field preemption case involved the Locomotive
Inspection Act, and the implied preemption case involved the United
States Food and Drug Administration's approval of generic drugs. In
each case the Court found that the federal law preempted the state law.
1. Locomotive Inspection Act. Originally enacted in 1911 as the
Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act, the Locomotive Inspection Act
(LIA),56 as it is now known, provides that a railroad carrier may use a
locomotive only when the locomotive, including its parts and appurtenances, "[is] in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary
danger of personal injury. 5 7 In addition, the locomotive may be used
only if it has been inspected as required by the act and by any regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Transportation, and if it has
passed every test prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation.58
Although the LIA does not include a preemption provision, the United
States Supreme Court addressed its preemptive scope eighty-six years
ago in Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. 9 At the time
Congress enacted its predecessor, the LIA applied only to boilers, but
Congress expanded the LIA's scope in the 1915 and 1924 amendments.60 By the time the Supreme Court decided Napier in 1926,
Congress had conferred broad, general powers on the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) to administer and enforce the LIA!s
requirements. 6 These powers encompassed "the design, the construction, and the material of every part of the locomotive and tender and of
all appurtenances.1 2 Based on the breadth of the powers conferred on
the ICC, the Supreme Court held that "state legislation is precluded,
because the Boiler Inspection Act ...

was intended to occupy the

field." 8 Prior to the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals
6
recognized the preemptive effect of the LIA pursuant to Napier.

55.
131 S.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012); Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing,
Ct. 2567 (2011).
49 U.S.C. § 20701 (2006).
Id. § 20701(1).
Id. § 20701(2), (3).
272 U.S. 605, 606-07 (1926).
Id. at 608.
Id. at 611.

62. Id.
63. Id. at 613.
64. Key v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 228 Ga. App. 305,305-06,491 S.E.2d 511, 513-14 (1997);
Cent. of Ga. R.R. Co. v. Markert, 200 Ga. App. 851, 851-52, 410 S.E.2d 437, 438 (1991).
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During the survey period, the United States Supreme Court revisited
this issue in Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.6 5 The case
involved the death of George Corson, who worked as a welder and
machinist by the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad from
1947 until 1974. His duties included installing brake shoes on
locomotives and stripping insulation from locomotive boilers, and this
work exposed him to asbestos. He was diagnosed with malignant
mesothelioma in 2005, and in 2007 he filed a lawsuit in a Pennsylvania
state court against fifty-nine defendants, including Railroad Friction
Products Corp. (RFPC), a distributor of locomotive brake shoes that
contained asbestos, and Viad Corp., the successor to a manufacturer of
locomotive engine valves that contained asbestos. He died several
months later. The complaint alleged that RFPC's brake shoes and Viad's
engine valves were defectively designed because they contained asbestos
and that RFPC and Viad failed to warn about the dangers of asbestos or
to provide instructions for safely handling it. RFPC and Viad removed
the case to federal court and moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the LIA preempted the state-law claims against them. The
district court granted the motion, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 6
The plaintiffs, Corson's widow and the executrix of his estate, argued
that the LIA did not preempt their state-law claims for two reasons.6 7
First, they argued that the preemptive effect of the LIA was narrowed
by the preemption provision in the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970
(FRSA),68 which permits states to regulate railroad safety until the
Secretary of Transportation promulgates a regulation or issues an order
covering the same subject matter.69 Because the Secretary of Transportation had not promulgated a regulation or issued an order covering the
use of asbestos in locomotives or locomotive parts, the plaintiffs argued
that their state-law claims were not preempted.70 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument because the FRSA specifically provides that it
does not alter federal laws on railroad safety that existed at the time
Congress enacted it.7
Because the LIA existed before Congress

65.

132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012).

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 1264-65.
Id. at 1266.
49 U.S.C. ch. 201.
Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1267; see also 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2).
Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1267.
Id.; see also 49 U.S.C. § 20103(a).
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enacted the FRSA, the preemptive effect of the LIA, as defined by
Napier, was unchanged by the FRSA's preemption provision. 2
Second, the plaintiffs argued that their state-law claims were not
included within the field preempted by the LIA.7" They first argued
that the LIs preempted field did not include state-law claims arising
out of the repair and maintenance of locomotives, but the Supreme Court
found that this argument was foreclosed by Napier.74 Because Napier
held that the LIA was intended "'to occupy the entire field of regulating
locomotive equipment,'" and the plaintiffs' claims implicated locomotive
equipment, the Supreme Court held that "Itihe pre-empted field as
7
defined by Napier plainly encompasses the claims at issue here." 1
Further, because Napierdid not distinguish between hazards arising out
of the repair and maintenance of locomotives and hazards arising out of
the use of locomotives on a railroad line, this distinction was irrelevant.7 ' The plaintiffs also argued that their state-law claims for failure
to warn were not preempted because these claims were not based on the
design or manufacture of the products. 7 The Supreme Court rejected
this overly nuanced characterization because the gravamen of these
claims was that Corson died because he was exposed to asbestos
contained in locomotive parts and appurtenances.7" Characterized in
that manner, the plaintiffs' state-law claims for failure to warn were
directed at locomotive equipment, which is within the LIA's preempted
field under Napier."
The plaintiffs' next argument for why their state-law claims were
outside the preempted field was that the LIA did not apply to manufacturers during the time when Corson was exposed to asbestos.8 0 While
it is true that manufacturers were not subject to the LIs penalty
provision until 1988, "Napierdefined the field pre-empted by the LIA on
the basis of the physical elements regulated-the equipment of
locomotives'--not on the basis of the entity directly subject to regulation."8 ' In any event, the Supreme Court noted that the plaintiffs'
argument was "contrary to common sense" because "a railroad's ability

72. Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1267.
73. Id. Interestingly, the plaintiffs chose to distinguish Napier rather than argue that
it should be overruled. Id.
74. Id. at 1267-68.
75. Id. (quoting Napier, 272 U.S. at 611).
76. Id. (citing Napier,272 U.S. at 611-12).
77. Id. at 1268.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citingNapier, 272 U.S. at 611-12).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1269 (quoting Napier, 272 U.S. at 612).
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to equip its fleet of locomotives in compliance with federal standards is
meaningless if manufacturers are not allowed to produce locomotives and
locomotive parts that meet those standards." 2 Finally, the plaintiffs
argued that the LIA preempts only state legislation and regulations but
not state common-law claims." Again, however, the Supreme Court
noted that the LIA "'occup[ies] the entire field of regulating locomotive
equipment'" without exception." In sum, because the plaintiffs' statelaw claims were directed at locomotive equipment, they were included
within the field preempted by the LIA, as that field was defined by
Napier. 5
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, concurred
in part and dissented in part."6 Because of the principle of stare
decisis, she agreed that Napier required the conclusion that the LIA
preempts state-law claims based on an alleged design defect.8 7
However, she contended that Napier would be decided differently today
because the Supreme Court's more recent field preemption decisions
have required some statutory language expressly requiring it or a
scheme of federal regulation much more pervasive than that imposed by
the LIA. s s As to state-law claims based on an alleged failure to warn,
she contended that such claims are not preempted because they are
fundamentally different from state-law claims based on an alleged
design defect.8 9 She disagreed with the majority's treatment of these
two types of claims as congruent because unlike the plaintiffs' designdefect claim, their failure-to-warn claims, "if successful, would have no
necessary effect on the physical equipment of locomotives at all." 0
Justice Kagan wrote a concurring opinion in which she joined the
majority's opinion in full while at the same time criticizing Napier as an
"anachronism" when it is "[vliewed through the lens of modern
preemption law."91 Like Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan doubted
that Napier would be decided the same way today, but unlike Justice
Sotomayor, Justice Kagan saw no distinction in Napier between claims
based on a design defect and claims based on a failure to warn. 9 2 As

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Napier, 272 U.S. at 611).
Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1271-75 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1271-72.
Id.
Id. at 1272-74.
Id. at 1273.
Id. at 1270 (Kagan, J., concurring).
Id. at 1270-71.
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Justice Kagan explained, "if an agency has the power to prohibit the use
of locomotive equipment, it, also has the power to condition the use of
that equipment on proper warnings."93
2. United States Food and Drug Administration Approval of
Generic Drugs. Two years ago, this survey article discussed whether
the approval by the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
of a generic drug preempts state-law tort claims against the manufacturer of the drug.9 4 At that time, neither the Supreme Court nor the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had decided
this issue, but the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits had held that such claims were not preempted.9 5 In
addition, two federal district courts in Georgia reached the same
conclusion, primarily by relying on the opinions of the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits.96 Although there was not a split among the circuits on this
issue, some federal district courts had held that these claims were
preempted,9 7 and so the Supreme Court granted the petitions for writ
of certiorari in the Fifth and Eighth Circuit cases so that it could decide
9
this issue. 1
In Pliva, Inc. v.Mensing,99 the plaintiffs in two consolidated cases
alleged that they developed tardive dyskinesia, a severe neurological
disorder, after using metoclopramide for several years. Metoclopramide
is a drug used to treat digestive tract problems such as diabetic
gastroparesis and gastroesophageal reflux disorder, and its brand-name
version is Reglan, which is what the plaintiffs' doctors actually
prescribed for them. The plaintiffs sued the manufacturers of the
generic metoclopramide that they used, alleging that long-term use of
metoclopramide caused their tardive dyskinesia and that the generic
manufacturers failed to provide adequate warning labels. 1°'

93. Id. at 1270.
94. Franklin P. Brannen, Jr. & Jacob E. Daly, Product Liability, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 62 MERCER L. REv. 243, 270-73 (2010).
95. Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428,449 (5th Cir. 2010); Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc.,
588 F.3d 603, 612 (8th Cir. 2009).
96. Swicegood v. Pliva, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-1671-TWT, 2010 WL 1138455, at *6-*7 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 22,2010); Weilbrenner v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1337-38
(M.D. Ga. 2010). According to a search on PACER, these orders were not appealed to the
Eleventh Circuit; instead, the parties reached agreements to settle the claims.
97. Weilbrenner, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 1337-38 & n.15.
98. Actavis, Inc. v. Demahy, 131 S. Ct. 817 (2010); Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct.
817 (2010); Actavis Elizabeth, LLC v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 817 (2010). The three appeals
were consolidated for decision.
99. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
100. Id. at 2572-73.
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The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims
were preempted because it was impossible for the generic manufacturers
to comply with the state-law duty alleged by the plaintiffs and the
labeling requirements imposed by federal law. 0 1 Specifically, the
plaintiffs alleged that the generic manufacturers should have changed
the warning labels on their products because they knew or should have
known that the labels inadequately conveyed the risks of long-term use
of metoclopramide. 102 However, federal law governing drug labels
imposes different duties on brand-name manufacturers and generic
manufacturers.1 0 3 Generic manufacturers are required to use a label
that is the same as the brand-name label, and the FDA's position is that
generic manufacturers are permitted to change a label only when the
FDA instructs it to do so or when it is matching an updated brand-name
label.' ° In other words, generic manufacturers are not permitted to
unilaterally change a label, even if the change is to strengthen the
warning.0 5 Nor are generic manufacturers permitted to send 'Dear
Doctor" letters to healthcare professionals because the FDA considers
such letters to be "labeling."' In the absence of any reason offered by
the plaintiffs to find the FDA's position to be plainly erroneous, the
Supreme Court deferred to the FDA's interpretation of its own regulations.' ' Because the generic manufacturers could not simultaneously
change their labels and keep them the same, their state-law duties and
their federal-law duties were in irreconcilable conflict, which meant that
their state-law duties had to yield.'0 8
The FDA does permit generic manufacturers to propose changes to a
label if it believes changes are necessary' 9 In fact, the FDA's position
is that generic manufacturers have a duty to propose label changes when
they become aware of safety issues with a drug."0 If the FDA agrees
that changes are necessary, it will work with the brand-name manufacturer to create a new label, which the generic manufacturers then must
adopt."' The generic manufacturers in this case disputed the FDA's
position that proposing label changes is a duty, but the Supreme Court

101. Id. at 2577-78.
102. Id. at 2574.

103. Id.
104. Id. at 2574-75.
105. Id. at 2575.
106. Id. at 2576.
107. Id. at 2575-76.
108. Id. at 2577-78.
109. Id. at 2576.

110.
111.

Id.
Id.
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found it unnecessary to resolve this dispute." 2 "The question for
'impossibility' is whether the private party could independently do under
federal law what state law requires of it.""' Here, however, the
generic manufacturers could only propose label changes to the FDA; they
were not permitted to make any changes unilaterally. 1 4
Thus,
although proposing label changes would have satisfied their federal-law
duty, this would not have satisfied their state-law duty."5 According
to the plaintiffs, the generic manufacturers were required to provide
stronger labels, and this duty would not have been satisfied merely by
communicating with the FDA about possible label changes." 6 The
plaintiffs argued that when a generic manufacturer's ability to comply
with state law depends on the FDA's approval of a proposed label
change, the preemption analysis should turn on whether the manufacturer can prove that the FDA would have accepted or rejected the
change." 7 The plaintiffs further argued that the generic manufacturers
in this case could not satisfy their burden of proving impossibility
because they had not even proposed a label change to the FDA."' The
Supreme Court conceded that this was a "fair argument," but it
nevertheless rejected it:
Mensing and Demahy's argument would render conflict pre-emption
largely meaningless because it would make most conflicts between
state and federal law illusory. We can often imagine that a third party
or the Federal Government might do something that makes it lawful
for a private party to accomplish under federal law what state law
requires of it....
If these conjectures suffice to prevent federal and state law from
conflicting for Supremacy Clause purposes, it is unclear when, outside
of express pre-emption, the Supremacy Clause would have any
force." 9
The general rule established by this case, therefore, is that "When a
party cannot satisfy its state duties without the Federal Government's
special permission and assistance, which is dependent on the exercise of
judgment by a federal agency, that party cannot independently satisfy

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2576-77.
at 2579.
at 2576.
at 2578.
at 2578-79.
at 2579.
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those state duties for pre-emption purposes." 120 Because federal law
prohibited the generic manufacturers in this case from doing what state
them to do, the plaintiffs' state-law claims were preemptlaw required
1
ed.

12

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan,
dissented because she believed that the majority's decision was
inconsistent with Wyeth v. Levine 2 2 insofar as it did not require the
generic manufacturers to show that the FDA would not have approved
Because the generic manufacturers never
a proposed label change."
proposed a label change to the FDA, they had no evidence supporting
their argument that it was impossible for them to comply with both
federal and state law.'2 4 As such, all they had shown was "the mere
possibility of impossibility" or "'a hypothetical or potential conflict"'
between federal and state law, which is insufficient to establish
impossibility preemption. 1 25 Thus, Justice Sotomayor would find
impossibility only if there was evidence showing that (1) the FDA
rejected a label change proposed by a generic manufacturer; (2) the FDA
had not responded to a label change proposed by a generic manufacturer
by the time the plaintiff was injured; or (3) the FDA had itself considered whether to request a label change by the brand-name manufacturer
but had decided not to change the label. 26
The majority answered Justice Sotomayor's critique by noting that its
decision did not conflict with Wyeth. 127 While the result in this case
was different from the result in Wyeth, the different outcomes were
justified by the difference between the regulations applicable to generic
Unlike generic
manufacturers and brand-name manufacturers. 12
manufacturers, brand-name manufacturers were permitted to make
unilateral changes to a label-that is, without the FDA's prior approval.129 In that sense, brand-name manufacturers were able to comply
with their state-law tort duties in a way that generic manufacturers
could not. 3 '

120. Id. at 2581.
121. Id.
122. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
123.

Pliva,Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2588 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Wyeth, 555 U.S.

at 568-71).
124. Id. at 2587-88.
125. Id. (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)).
126. Id. at 2588-89.
127. Id. at 2581 (majority opinion) (citing Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 559-60).
128.

Id. (citing Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 572-73).

129. Id.
130. Id.
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The majority recognized that it may seem unfair to allow lawsuits
against brand-name manufacturers but not against generic manufacturers, but "different federal statutes and regulations may, as here, lead to
different pre-emption results."131
It is not the Supreme Court's
function to decide whether a federal law is "'unusual or even bizarre,'"
and so the majority refused to "distort the Supremacy Clause in order to
create similar pre-emption across a dissimilar statutory scheme. " "'
Instead, "Congress and the FDA retain the authority to change the law
133
and regulations if they so desire."
B.

Statute of Repose

Because many product liability claims do not accrue until years after
exposure to or use of the allegedly defective product, the statute of
repose is an important defense for manufacturers. Unlike a statute of
limitations, which does not begin to run until the cause of action
accrues,"M "[a] statute of ultimate repose delineates a time period in
which a right may accrue. If the injury occurs outside that period, it is
not actionable.""3 ' In other words, "a statute of limitations operates
only on an existing cause of action, while a statute of repose may operate
to extinguish or abolish a potential cause of action prior to its existence."'36 Thus, a statute of repose stands as a substantial obstacle for
plaintiffs because it can bar an action even before an injury occurs and
before the statute of limitations begins to run.'
Similarly, a statute
of repose can effectively shorten the limitations period if the cause of
action accrues with less time remaining in the repose period than in the

131. Id. at 2581-82.
132. Id. at 2582 (quoting Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2733 (2009)).
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (2007) (providing that claims for personal injuries must

be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues).
135. Hill v. Fordham, 186 Ga. App. 354, 357, 367 S.E.2d 128, 131 (1988); see also
Gwinnett Place Assocs., L.P. v. Pharr Eng'g, Inc., 215 Ga. App. 53, 54 n.2, 449 S.E.2d 889,
890 n.2 (1994) ("A statute of ultimate repose limits absolutely the time during which a

party may bring an action, regardless of when the cause of action accrues.

It is

distinguished from a statute of limitation, which is a procedural rule delineating a time
period measured from the accrual of the right of action during which a party must bring
an action.").
136. CHARLEs R. ADAMS Ill, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS § 25:9, at 547 (2011-2012 ed.).

137. Hatcher v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 Ga. 100, 101, 344 S.E.2d 418, 420 (1986),
superseded by statute on other grounds,O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(c) (2000 & Supp. 2012); Hanna
v. McWilliams, 213 Ga. App. 648, 651,446 S.E.2d 741,744 (1994) (en banc) ('Moreover, the

eight-year repose limit applies regardless of when the injury occurs or, indeed, whether a
cause of action has accrued at all prior to the expiration of the period.").
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limitations period. 13 For example, a cause of action that accrues one
month before the repose period expires will be barred if a lawsuit is not
filed within that month, even
if the cause of action is subject to a two9
year limitations period."1
Georgia's statute of repose for product liability claims, which the
Georgia Supreme Court has described as "an unyielding barrier to a
plaintiff's right of action," 4 ° bats strict liability claims brought more
than ten years after "the date of the first sale for use or consumption of
the personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the injury." 4 1 The statute similarly bars negligence claims, except those based
on injuries or damages arising out of (1) negligence in manufacturing a
product that causes disease or birth defects; (2) conduct that "manifests
a willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property"; and (3) a
negligent failure to warn.'42 Most litigation involving the statute of
repose has focused on determining when the repose period begins to run,
which in turn has required the courts to interpret the meaning of the
phrase "first sale for use or consumption."'
But with the meaning of
that phrase having been clarified by the Georgia Supreme Court last
year,'" there is little left to litigate with respect to when the repose
period begins to run. Consequently, when a person is injured by a
product that was first sold more than ten years before the injury
occurred, he will find it difficult to argue that the repose period has not
expired. Instead, he will be left to argue that an exception applies. The
most important of these exceptions, and the one most likely to generate
145
litigation, is the exception for willful, reckless, and wanton conduct.

138. Hatcher, 256 Ga. at 101, 344 S.E.2d at 420.
139. Id. (Gregory, J., dissenting) ("If someone is injured by the use of personal property
on the last day, or very near the end, of the ten year period commencing with the date of
first sale, there is a great likelihood the injured person would have no opportunity to file

suit within the ten year period.").
140. Wright v. Robinson, 262 Ga. 844, 845, 426 S.E.2d 870, 871 (1993).
141. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(2).
142. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(c).
143. See, e.g., Campbell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 288 Ga. 535, 536-37,707 S.E.2d 48,49-50
(2011); Pafford v. Biomet, 264 Ga. 540, 541-43, 448 S.E.2d 347, 348-49 (1994); Johnson v.
Ford Motor Co., 281 Ga. App. 166, 169-71, 637 S.E.2d 202, 204-06 (2006). This issue has

been discussed in prior survey articles. Brannen & Daly, supra note 1, at 299-305;
Franklin P. Brannen, Jr. & Jacob E. Daly, Product Liability, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 61 MERCER L. REv. 267, 294-96 (2009); Franklin P. Brannen, Jr. et al., Product
Liability, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 59 MERCER L. REV. 331, 359-63 (2007).
144. Campbell, 288 Ga. at 536-39, 707 S.E.2d at 49-51.
145. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(c). The exception for cases involving a product that allegedly
caused a disease or a birth defect is obviously quite narrow. Indeed, there are no reported
appellate decisions involving the substance of this exception. The Georgia Supreme Court
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As with other exceptions to a statute of repose, the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving that the manufacturer's conduct was willful, reckless,
and wanton. 4" This is an exceedingly high standard that the Georgia
Supreme Court has equated with actual intent to injure: 'Wilful conduct
is based on an actual intention to do harm or inflict injury; wanton
conduct is that which is so reckless or so charged with indifference to the
47
consequences... [as to be the] equivalent in spirit to actual intent."W
In Watkins v. Ford Motor Co.,14' for example, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs had presented
sufficient evidence of Ford's willful, reckless, and wanton conduct to
defeat Ford's motion for summary judgment. 149 The plaintiffs demonstrated that Ford knew about stability problems with the Bronco II but
decided not to implement certain alterations to the vehicle's design that
were recommended by its own engineers and that would have improved
stability because doing so would have delayed production and diminished
profits. 50 Using Watkins as its benchmark, the Eleventh Circuit
decided another case during the survey period in which the plaintiff
argued that her claim for negligent design was not barred by the statute
of repose because the manufacturer had acted willfully, recklessly, and
wantonly. 5 ' Coincidentally, this case also involved a vehicle manufactured by Ford.
In Ivy v. Ford Motor Co.,52 the plaintiff was injured while driving
a 1996 Ford Explorer when she swerved to avoid colliding with another
vehicle, which caused her vehicle to roll over. The plaintiff's mother
purchased the vehicle in September 1995, and the plaintiff filed the
lawsuit on May 20, 2008. Among other allegations, the plaintiff alleged
that the vehicle was defectively designed, and her expert opined that the
vehicle was unreasonably dangerous due to inadequate rollover

has, however, rejected constitutional challenges to the statute of repose based on this
exception. Love v. Whirlpool Corp., 264 Ga. 701, 703-04, 449 S.E.2d 602, 605-06 (1994).
The exception for cases alleging a negligent failure to warn is much broader than the
exception for cases alleging a disease or a birth defect, but a claim for negligent failure to

warn is difficult because a manufacturer can be liable only for a latent danger that it
knows about.
146. Parks v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 294 Ga. App. 112, 116, 668 S.E.2d 554, 558
(2008).
147. Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723, 726, 450 S.E.2d 208,212 (1994) (alteration

in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Vickery v. Waste Mgmt. of Ga.,
Inc., 249 Ga. App. 659, 660, 549 S.E.2d 482, 484 (2001).
148. 190 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 1999).
149. Id. at 1216-17.
150. Id.
151. Ivy v. Ford Motor Co., 646 F.3d 769 (11th Cir. 2011).
152. 646 F.3d 769 (11th Cir. 2011).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

248

[Vol. 64

resistance, that there were technologically and economically feasible
design alternatives available at the time Ford designed the vehicle, that
Ford could have improved the vehicle's stability by lowering its center
of gravity and/or increasing its track width, and that these modifications
would not have diminished the vehicle's function or utility. The federal
district court granted Ford's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that this claim was barred by the statute of repose. 5
Because the plaintiff filed the lawsuit almost thirteen years after her
mother purchased the vehicle, the Eleventh Circuit noted that her claim
for negligent design was barred by the statute of repose unless she could
provide evidence of Ford's willful, reckless, or wanton conduct."5 To
evaluate Ford's knowledge of rollover problems with the Explorer, the
Eleventh Circuit examined "reputable mainstream sources."'55 Most
notably, the Eleventh Circuit relied on rollover tests conducted by the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), which
showed that the Explorer performed very well compared to other sportutility vehicles.' 56 Moreover, when Ford first developed the Explorer
in the late 1980s, it used one of the two tests that NHTSA later
determined to be the most reliable, and the Explorer passed Ford's
internal tests. 57 And when Ford first marketed the Explorer in 1990,
it passed a test conducted by the Consumers Union and was recommended by the Consumers Union in Consumer Reports magazine. 58 All of
this showed that "the Explorer performed well by all mainstream
standards reflected on this record at the time it was marketed, and
continued to perform well in testing done approximately five years after
its release."' 59

The plaintiff relied on Watkins to argue that she had presented
sufficient evidence of Ford's willful, reckless, or wanton conduct to
survive summary judgment. 6 ° The Eleventh Circuit rejected this
argument because the Explorer rated better than the Bronco II from a
stability standpoint, a point conceded by the plaintiff's expert, and
because there was no evidence showing that Ford had chosen profits over
safety with respect to the Explorer, as there was with respect to the
Bronco II.161

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

In fact, Ford accepted and implemented the only two

771-72.
773.
773-74.
774.
774-75.
775 (citing Watkins, 190 F.3d at 1216-17).
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stability-related changes to the Explorer's design that were recommended by its own engineers.1'6 , In light of the Explorer's performance on
both independent and internal tests, as well as the lack of evidence that
had been so damning in Watkins, the Eleventh Circuit held that "a
reasonable juror could not find the wanton and willful standard to be
met."'6 3 Regarding the testimony of the plaintiff's expert, the Eleventh
Circuit held that "merely finding an after-the-fact expert to opine that
a product is defective cannot be sufficient to create a jury question on
the issue of wantonness ...when the product satisfied the government
1
and industry standards extant at the earlier relevant time." 6
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment to Ford on the ground that the plaintiff's claim for
negligent design was barred by the statute of repose.'65
C. Assumption of the Risk
"The affirmative defense of assumption of the risk bars recovery when
it is established that a plaintiff, without coercion of circumstances,
chooses a course of action with full knowledge of its danger and while
166
exercising a free choice as to whether to engage in the act or not."
In product liability cases, this defense bars both negligence claims and
strict liability claims.16 7 To establish that a plaintiff assumed the risk,
a defendant must show that "the plaintiff (1) had actual knowledge of
the danger; (2) understood and appreciated the risks associated with
such danger; and (3) voluntarily exposed himself to those risks." 6 ' As
this suggests, "the standard to be applied in assessing an assumption of
the risk defense is a subjective one, geared to the particular plaintiff and
his situation, rather than that of a reasonable person of ordinary
prudence who appears in [the completely separate defense of] contributory negligence."16 9 Whether a plaintiff assumed the risk of injury is

162. Id. at 776.
163. Id. at 777.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 778.
166. Muldovan v. McEachern, 271 Ga. 805, 807, 523 S.E.2d 566, 569 (1999) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
167. Whirlpool Corp. v. Hurlbut, 166 Ga. App. 95, 100-01, 303 S.E.2d 284, 288-89
(1983).
168. Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862, 864, 471 S.E.2d 866, 868 (1996) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
169. Muldovan, 271 Ga. at 808, 523 S.E.2d at 569 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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usually a question of fact for the jury, but the issue may be determined
as a matter of law if the evidence is plain, palpable, and undisputed. 70
To assume a risk, a plaintiff must have subjective knowledge of "the
specific, particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition
A comprehension of "general, nonthat proximately causes injury."'
specific risks that might be associated with such conditions or activities"
As with many rules, it is easy to articulate the rule
will not suffice.'
but difficult to apply it to the facts of particular cases. Thus, while it is
easy to say that a plaintiff assumes the risk of injury if he has specific
knowledge of the danger but that he does not if he has only general
knowledge, the cases that are litigated are those in which the specificity
or generality of the plaintiff's knowledge lies somewhere along the
middle of this spectrum. Of course, plaintiffs want to define the danger
narrowly to make it more likely that their knowledge is not specific
enough, whereas defendants want to define the danger broadly for the
opposite purpose. Recent cases in Georgia have favored defendants by
not requiring such specific knowledge. 7
The Georgia Court of Appeals decided one case during the survey
period involving assumption of the risk. In Yamaha Motor Corp., USA
v. McTaggart,74 the plaintiff was injured when his 2006 Yamaha
Rhino 660 rolled over onto his left leg. The Rhino was a four-wheel,
open-air (i.e., no doors or windows), off-road vehicle and had two bucket
seats, a steel roof cage, a slip-resistant floor board, foot guards to help
occupants keep their feet and legs inside, hip guards, handholds, and
three-point seatbelts. It also had a warning sticker that instructed
occupants to keep their arms and legs inside and warned users about the
possibility of severe injury or death if they tried to prevent a rollover
with their arms or legs. When the plaintiff purchased the Rhino, the
salesman offered to sell him a flexible plastic weather enclosure, but he
declined because he preferred open access so he could more easily get
into and out of the Rhino. After using the Rhino for about seven
months, the plaintiff was injured when he put it in gear and applied
slight pressure to the gas pedal while turning slightly to the right. The
Rhino traveled less than six feet and rolled over onto the plaintiff's leg,

170. Bodymasters Sports Indus., Inc. v. Wimberley, 232 Ga. App. 170, 174, 501 S.E.2d
556, 560 (1998).
171. Vaughn, 266 Ga. at 864, 471 S.E.2d at 868.
172. Id.

173. See, e.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. State Broadcasting Corp., 314 Ga. App. 648,650,725
S.E.2d 789, 791 (2012); Kane v. Landscape Structures,.Inc., 309 Ga. App. 14, 18,709 S.E.2d
876, 880 (2011) (en banc); Teems v. Bates, 300 Ga. App. 70, 74-75, 684 S.E.2d 662, 667-68
(2009).
174. 313 Ga. App. 103, 720 S.E.2d 217 (2011).
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which he had involuntarily stuck out to prevent the rollover. The
plaintiff sued Yamaha in negligence and strict liability, alleging that his
injury was caused by a latent stability defect and the absence of doors
on the Rhino. Shortly before trial, the plaintiff abandoned his claim
based on a latent stability defect, which meant that his only theory of
liability at trial was that the Rhino was defectively designed because it
did not have doors. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the
amount of $317,002.17

Yamaha argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying its
motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, both of which were based on Yamaha's argument that the
plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury as a matter of law. 178 The
court of appeals agreed with Yamaha because the undisputed evidence
at trial showed that the plaintiff knew about the specific danger
presented by the lack of doors on the Rhino, appreciated the risks
associated with that danger, and voluntarily exposed himself to those
risks. 177 According to the plaintiff's own testimony at trial, he wanted
the Rhino precisely because it did not have doors, and he read and
understood the warnings both on the Rhino and in the operator's manual
about the dangers of not keeping his arms and legs inside. 178 In fact,
when the salesman reviewed these warnings with him, the plaintiff
laughed and said that it was common sense to keep your arms and legs
inside. 79 Further, the plaintiff testified that he had substantial
experience operating other off-road vehicles, that those vehicles
presented a similar danger in the event of a rollover because they were
not enclosed, and that operators of those vehicles were supposed to keep
their arms and legs inside during a rollover.8 0
The plaintiff argued that he did not know that he might involuntarily
stick his leg out of the Rhino during a rollover, but the court of appeals
found that this argument was belied by the plaintiff's own testimony.'8' The plaintiff testified that if the Rhino started to roll over, the
operator should brace his feet on the floorboard if he had time and
should keep his arms and legs inside to the best of his ability.8 2 He
further testified that the operator probably would not intentionally stick
175. Id. at 103-05, 720 S.E.2d at 218-19. The verdict included $25,000 allocated to the
claim for loss of consortium for the plaintiffs wife. Id. at 105, 720 S.E.2d at 219.
176. Id. at 105, 720 S.E.2d at 219.
177. Id. at 106, 720 S.E.2d at 219.
178. Id. at 106, 720 S.E.2d at 219-20.
179. Id. at 107, 720 S.E.2d at 220.
180. Id. at 107-08, 720 S.E.2d at 220-21.
181. Id. at 108-09, 720 S.E.2d at 221.
182. Id.
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his arms or legs out of the Rhino.'83 These qualifications on the
plaintiff's testimony showed that he knew an operator might not be able
to keep his arms and legs inside the Rhino and that an operator's arms
or legs might involuntarily extend outside the occupant compartment
Based on the plaintiff's knowledge about the
during a rollover.'
dangers to arms and legs presented by the doorless Rhino, the court of
appeals held that he assumed the risk of injury."5 Accordingly, the
for
court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of Yamaha's motions
86
directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
D.

Learned Intermediary Doctrine

Generally, manufacturers and suppliers owe a duty to foreseeable
users of their product to warn about foreseeable dangers in the
product."17 The learned intermediary doctrine is an exception to this
general rule that relieves manufacturers and suppliers of the duty to
warn if there is a learned intermediary between them and the ultimate
user.'8 The classic example of a learned intermediary is a doctor, and
this doctrine provides a defense to manufacturers and suppliers of
prescription drugs and medical devices because doctors are in the best
position to warn their patients about the risks of these products.'8 9
Thus, Georgia's appellate courts and federal courts applying Georgia law
have held that manufacturers' 9" and suppliers, such as pharmacists"9 and pharmaceutical sales representatives, 192 do not owe the
patient a duty to warn. Instead, the duty to warn is owed to the doctor,
and manufacturers and suppliers may be liable if the warning to the
doctor is inadequate.' 93
Although most litigation involving the learned intermediary doctrine
arises in the context of healthcare, manufacturers and suppliers of
prescription drugs and medical devices are not the only entities to which

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 109, 720 S.E.2d at 221.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Moore v. ECI Mgmt., 246 Ga. App. 601, 606, 542 S.E.2d 115, 120-21 (2000).

188. Dozier Crane & Mach., Inc. v. Gibson, 284 Ga. App. 496,498,644 S.E.2d 333,335-

36 (2007).
189. McCombs v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 277 Ga. 252, 253, 587 S.E.2d 594, 595 (2003).

190. Id.
191. Chamblin v. K-Mart Corp., 272 Ga. App. 240,243-44,612 S.E.2d 25,27-29 (2005).
192. Catlett v. Wyeth, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1381 (M.D. Ga. 2004).
193. McCombs, 277 Ga. at 253, 587 S.E.2d at 595; Swicegood v. Pliva, Inc., No. 1:07CV-1671-TWT, 2010 WL 1138455, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2010); Weilbrenner v. Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1339-40 (M.D. Ga. 2010).
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this doctrine applies, and doctors are not the only learned intermediaries. This doctrine also has been applied to a manufacturer of liquefied
petroleum gas, the learned intermediary being the retail distributor of
the gas,"9 and to a manufacturer of a pesticide, the learned intermediary being the licensed pest control operator. 9 ' However, this doctrine
has been held not to apply to a company that refurbished a crane that
was later purchased and used at a construction site by a crane operating
company. 9 6 Unfortunately, the courts have not articulated a clear
standard for determining when this doctrine will apply, though at a
minimum, the alleged intermediary must actually be learned about the
danger associated with the product. This was the issue confronted by
the Eleventh Circuit in one case decided during the survey period.
In Parker v. Schmiede Machine & Tool Corp.,97 the plaintiffs were
employees and former employees of Lockheed Martin Corp. who were
exposed to beryllium while working at Lockheed's facility in Marietta.
Some of the plaintiffs contracted chronic beryllium disease, and others
developed beryllium sensitization, allegedly due to sandblasting,
polishing, drilling, and other types of high-velocity abrading of aircraft
parts that contain beryllium, which created respirable particles. The
plaintiffs sued Lockheed and several manufacturers of berylliumcontaining parts, and after years of litigation, only four defendants
remained, and the only surviving claim was for failure to warn. The
remaining defendants filed motions for summary judgment, and after
initially denying the motions, the federal district court reversed itself
and granted the motions on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims were
barred by the learned intermediary doctrine. '9"
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed Lockheed's experience with
beryllium and concluded that it is "a sophisticated user of beryllium and
a learned intermediary between its employees and the manufacturers of
beryllium products."'9 9
The plaintiffs did not dispute Lockheed's
experience with beryllium but instead argued that the defendants had
superior knowledge about the risks associated with it and failed to warn
Lockheed about those risks. 20 0 The Eleventh Circuit examined the
evidence upon which the plaintiffs relied but determined that all such

194. Exxon Corp. v. Jones, 209 Ga. App. 373, 375, 433 S.E.2d 350, 352-53 (1993).
195. Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., 178 Ga. App. 438,441-42,343 S.E.2d 715, 71819, affd, 256 Ga. 255, 347 S.E.2d 568 (1986).
196. Dozier Crane & Mach., Inc., 284 Ga. App. at 498-99, 644 S.E.2d at 335-36.
197. 445 F. App'x 231 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
198. Id. at 232-34.
199. Id. at 235.

200. Id.
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evidence was either inadmissible or unrelated to the defendants.2" 1
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit found that "the Plaintiffs fail[ed] to adduce
evidence demonstrating knowledge of beryllium hazards that the
Defendants had but failed to disclose to Lockheed."20 2 More importantly, the Eleventh Circuit found that "the Plaintiffs also fail[ed] to
demonstrate that Lockheed lacked actual knowledge regarding the
hazards of beryllium." °3 The plaintiffs argued that Lockheed lacked
knowledge of certain risks associated with beryllium, but the Eleventh
Circuit determined that the evidence upon which the plaintiffs relied did
not actually support their argument. °4 To the contrary, the Eleventh
Circuit held that there was "overwhelming" evidence showing that
Lockheed was a learned and sophisticated user of beryllium and that its
knowledge of the risks associated with beryllium was superior to the
defendants' knowledge. 2 5 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment. °6

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 235-36.
at 236.
at 236-38.
at 238.

